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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
CASE NO. 18960 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for the willful 
trespass upon and intentional inflicting of damages to a mountain 
real estate subdivision being developed in the Fish Lake Mountain 
area of Sevier County, Utah. 1 The damage was done upon the 
pretext that old, non-operating remnant of an ancient inactive 
"ditch" was still traceable. 
1 In its bench ruling, the Court found that Defendant went on 
Plaintiffs' Property willfully "to make a massive, senseless, not 
purposeful ditch across their premises and for the purpose of 
injuring PL1intiffs" (Tr. 560). 
DISPOSITIO'.J IN THE LO\.JEIC COURT 
The Trial Court 
"Defendant") had "sense'· y '°"'"'' wi 11 ft 
Property to their damage l' )54,000.00. 
RELil .;OUGHT ON AP!' .\L 
The Plaintiffs and respondents ask that the Trial 
Court's judgment be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two cases, (the earlier No. 8461 Thorsen v. Johnson, 
et. al. and the second No. 8564 Gooseberry Estates v. Thorsen et. 
al.), were consolidated for trial. The substance of the joined 
litigation concerned the damage done by Defendant, Thorsen, to 
the subdivision of the Plaintiffs and in ruling upon the evidence 
the Trial Court designated the claimants in the second action 
(upon which the Trial Court's substantive judgment was based), as 
the Plaintiffs (R. 557). To allow cross reference of the Trial 
Judge's ruling and findings to the record, we will continue to 
designate the parties as the Trial Court did; i.e. : Gooseberry 
Estates, et al. as Plaintiffs and Harry Thorsen as Defendant. 
No appeal was taken from No. 8461. 
Subdivision Characteristics 
Plaintiffs owned 94. 4 7 acres (the "Property") fronted 
on the west, the longest dimension, by Gooseberry Creek (Exhibits 
1 and 3). The Property's longc·st ct LllH', ion was bisected 
laterally and almost equally between a fon i ed side-hill (the 
East half) which overlooked an associated rnc .. clnw (the West half) 
through which Gooseberry Creek flows (Exhibits 1, 6, 7, 33). The 
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Property's situation is convenient by paved highway to Salina, 
lltah, and intermediate in elevation between the valley floor and 
the summit of Fish Lake Mountain (Exhibits 8, 9, 33). Elevation 
gave it a pleasant (cooler) Summer atmosphere and the paved 
highway accorded it all-weather access for Winter activities 
(R. 316; Exhibit 33 location map). Forestation was sufficiently 
thick to obscure homes from roadway view accommodating a 
compliance with county zoning and subdivision regulations and the 
advantage of privacy (R. 259; Exhibit 8). Gooseberry Creek flows 
down the north slope of Fish Lake Mountain and in a northerly 
direction toward Salina Canyon (Exhibits l, 33). 
Defendant owns "several hundred" acres (R. 486; Exhibit 
8) adjoining Plaintiffs on the north (and thus downstream on 
Gooseberry Creek) and he had unmitigated objection to 
modification of the environment or demographics on land adjacent 
to him (R. 476; Exhibit 8) objecting to "dogs running at large, 
children playing in the ditches, and etc. * * *" (Exhibit 8). 
Plaintiffs' Property was otherwise attractive for a 
subdivision. It was inspected by a qualified, experienced 
appraiser (R. 311) who said that 
"The [type of subdivision] lots [that are 
desirable] are those lots that are wooded or 
that have privacy because of the wooded area 
and the fact that the trees were already 
there. You don't have to wait 6, 8, 10, or 
even more years for them to grow * * * and 
then hill itself is the type of property 
that your better division * * * These lots 
command a higher value by far than do the 
lots down in the valleys * * * The view that 
you have up in the meadow, the hillside on 
the other side, and the view both south and 
north from the hillside is very good and very 
important * " * being up on the hill, that 
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gives you a good v c·.:; the 'trr·"1: 
opinion, at le.:ist, J,-,_.,i t ••. ,i 
the view fror.i thrlt h 11 f''" dl1C 
it a more salable co11.m1..,dity (R. lll:i1. 
2_ I 1 
·- <:/ l< 
Culinary Water 
The subdivision h.:id, as an appurtenance, 
potable culinary water, and the right to drill a well had been 
approved by the State Engineer to supply the entire subdivision 
(R. 316). 
Without water, the value of any subdivision is markedly 
less (R. 316), and there were no other mountain subdivisions in 
Sevier County providing culinary water (R. 317). 
Forest Landscape 
The hillside was mapped for and divided into lots by 
registered engineers preliminary to the adoption of a subdivision 
plat (R. 54, 55). The subdivision not only contained lots all of 
which had the aesthetics of attractive trees and an overlook of 
the meadow (R. 268), but was also endowed with beneficial 
"natural sloping", for an appealing view as well as good drainage 
(R. 112). 
Plaintiffs were given approval of the preliminary plan 
by the Sevier County Planning Commission afte:c the hearing at 
which Defendant had vigorously protested (Exhibit 8) and the next 
day, following a field trip to the area, the PL1nning Commission 
recorded that: 
After viewing the site plan in th!! general 
area from the oiled road, the grC1up w:ilked 
across the open meado1.: to the east and up 
into the tree-covered hill side arc«1 pn,puscd 
to be subdivided. Thc·v fuund the trevc to be 
larger and thicker tha
0
n on lht> lm·:c·r si dl' of 
the hill. The irrignt·ic111 ditch \.,1 as larger 
th<m anticipated, but the lower bank much 
hither r-han anticip3ted (almost no chance of 
f loocli ng lower ground from anything flowing 
into the ditch) [Exhibit 8; minutes of 
Planning 
There was an adjacent paved (oiled) highway immediately 
west of the Property [Exhibit 8). When the Zoning Commission 
chairman looked at the area and observed that it was "heavily 
wooded * * * There is enough trees in it that you wouldn't see 
your neighbor off*** 200 feet away." (262-263). The Planning 
Commission "felt that an acre lot would satisfy the ordinance and 
conditions" as far as woods are concerned (R. 263). 
Adaptability and Accessibility 
The Zoning Administrator reemphasized that lots must 
not be smaller than one (1) acre in size in timbered area, and 
not less than five (5) acres in size in open area and the 
developers were given instructions "to proceed with the next 
phase of the approval process" (design plan) (Exhibit 9). The 
County observed in this approval the absence of open area 
development saying the Commission had "always been concerned 
[adversely) on mountain subdivisions about areas out in the 
open." (R. 259). 
The Commission observed that the subdivision, lying at 
an intermediate point between Salina (10 to 11 miles of Salina 
City proper) and still in mountainous terrain, "in the winter 
would undoubtedly be used quite heavily for snowmobiles." 
(R. 261) 
The Planning Commissioners all went from the paved road 
east to the subdivision, across an old wire gate and walked 
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across the Plaintiff's meadow ;:ind righL straight up the hill 
(R. 264). They found the functioning ( nul the 1 uwc• r 
later-trenched remnant) irrigiltion ditch which wc,s higher uµ on 
the hillside and around which Johnsons had planned their 
subdivision (R. 72). It had been a concern of the Planning 
Commission Knowing of an irrigation ditch going through the 
subdivision. The Planning Commission went to operating ditch 
"that goes way back and around that holler and back out." (R. 
266). 
Ditches 
Most importantly for purposes of this litigation, the 
entire Planning Commission (in the Fall of 1979, one year before 
Defendant trenched the old area) walked from west to east because 
they wanted to see the existing [presently functioning] 
irrigation ditch incorporated into the subdivision design plan. 
The Chairman of the Commission was asked whether or not they saw 
another or lower ditch [the one later dredged by Defendant]. The 
Commissioner answered: 
We walked across no ditch as such. You know I 
want to emphasize that this was over three 
years ago, but I know absolutely we walked 
across no ditch that water would run in when 
we traveled across there ,., * * and I don't 
remember even if there was an opening, I 
don't remember that "' * * but when we went 
there, there was no ditch (R. 266) 
Subdivision Approval 
The Comr.iissioner was asked what remained to be done for 
the completion of the proposed subdivision to bring it up to a 
developmental level so that it coeld be approvt>c1 b:,· the Zoning 
Administration (R. 266). In responst::, the ConiP1issioner answered: 
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They were to, given the opportunity, to proceed 
to get the transfer of water rights because 
this property had to have water for each lot 
and then there had to be a water right problems 
so the developers were to proceed with their 
desires, making a transfer of irrigation water 
with the State of Utah to get well rights to 
pump water out of the ground. They did drill 
a well in this general vicinity and it didn't 
turn out to be satisfactory so since they had 
made an effort to get water in a different 
location from another well, then they had to 
have sewage disposal approved by the State 
Health Department. So these three things was 
the water, the sewage part of it, and agree to 
go ahead with this road, were given the go 
ahead to proceed then with their preliminary 
design plans. The minutes will show that it 
was feasible that these things were done and 
the concept plan was approved and then at this 
meeting they were given the go ahead for the 
second plan. Now to the day, the second phase 
has not been completely presented. 
The first well drilled did not produce high quality 
water so another change application was made which Thorsen 
protested. Delay ensued for a number of months until the State 
Engineer could act on the amended exchange application of surface 
water rights to The Property for underground potable 
(well-produced) water. The State Engineer approved this second 
change in 1980 (R. 142, 478). 
Defendant's Willful Damage to Subdivision 
In August 1980, Plaintiffs took some water drilling 
equipment across a culvert on Plaintiffs' own Property and at the 
north and lower end of their tract. The culvert was to allow 
Willer from a small spring on the lower (northern) end of the 
P 1 ain tiffs' Property, and immediately adjacent to the Thorsen 
property, to flow down to the Thorsen (Defendant's) land (R. 2 in 
Case 81161). The heavy equipment required excavation which 
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collapsed the culvert; water linckc·,l up anrl fell into Gooseberry 
Creek and Defendant wa:; not cihlc to the watc1· thro111',h tJ,,. 
culvert which, although on Plaintiffs' land, acimiltedly went 
through an established right-of-way allowing Thorsen to obtain 
water for the upper end of a small part of Defendant's land (R. 
32). Thorsen filed suit for damages and an injunction. (R. 1-4, 
Case No. 8461). From these events Defendant knew that Plaintiffs 
were bringing in the drilling equipment for the purpose of 
relocating the well and that once the well was drilled there 
would be no further obstacle to development of the subdivision 
(R. 46). In the fall of 1980, probably during the deer season 
(R. 138), and immediately after Johnson drilled the water well 
under its State Engineer approved change application (R. 478) 
Defendant Thorsen hired Donald Gates to go through and dig an 
unnatural gorge through the forested part of the Plaintiffs' 
Property (R. 474). His purposes were to do the dredging 
surreptitiously. He did not take the question to the Board of 
Directors of Gooseberry Irrigation Company (R. 4 73) and did not 
talk to any one of those who owned the Gooseberry Estates 
Property [Plaintiffs] CR. 474). 
Thorsen at the trial said that he opposed creation of a 
subdivision on the Johnson Property because: 
Well, this is catlle country ;md it's used 
for a pasture ;-rn<l it with the 
irrigation ditch_c;;, " ,. clogs and kids 0nd 
everything roaming cl'lll111<l there disturhing 
the cattle and livestock ·:.- ,., ·:, above and next 
to my place and also above th;it was to 
pasture the cattle (R. 47)-47(1). 
development at all in Goosebe1-ry C:rn:;<m nncl he an:;\-1cred: "That's 
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ri1'.ht". Asked if he didn't want any development for residential 
Gooseberry is strictly for pasture land for 
cattle. 
Q And you are determined to keep it that 
way; isn't that right? 
A That's right. 
Q And you would go any length to do that, is 
that right? 
A Not necessarily, no. 
Q Well, you would go to every length within 
your means to stop it wouldn't you? 
A That I had a right to, yeah. 
He was asked: 
Q. Do you remember that an application was 
made to. transfer five shares owned by the 
Johnsons to Gooseberry Irrigation for an 
exchange?" 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there were hearings held before the 
State Engineer, weren't there? 
A. Right. 
Q. And it was right after the State Engineer's 
hearing and his approval of that exchange that 
you did this backhoe work wasn't it? 
A. On the spring ditch. 
Q. And soon after that they built the water 
well in August of 1980 and then you engaged 
Donald Gates to go up and do the trenching, 
isn't that right? 
A. To clean up the lo·.-1e:::- "B" ditch, ya. (R. 
4 78) . 
He said: 
I remembered taking hirn up there and told him 
where to start on the 10\ .. ·er part and where he 
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could go on the upper port and told him and 
showed him where to go ;md I don't remcmher 
going back until the ditch was done, and then I 
went back and inspected the ditch and it was 
alright. (R. 479). 
Q. And if you went up while he was working, 
you saw and aprroved what he was doing. 
A. Right. 
Q. You saw the size of the ditch that he was 
making. 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And you saw the depth of the ditch he was 
making. 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. You sent him up there expressly to do this 
trenching on the Johnson Property, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't give him any instructions at 
all to do work on your property anywhere? 
A. Not on my property, no. 
Q. And you didn't give him any instructions to 
do any work above the Johnson Property. 
A. Oh no. 
Q. So the only instructions you gave him was 
to go up and trench out the Johnson Property. 
A. That is right. (R. 482). 
Q. You started him right at the edge of the 
trench. 
A. That's true. (R. 482, 483). 
Q. The place you pointed out tr, him to start 
harpens to be right at the f'dgc of the trees 
do ·sn't it? 
A. True. 
Q. You did have him begin where the trees, 
where the dense trees commenced? 
- 10 -
A. Yes. That's right. Where the trees 
commenced and that's where he started to dig. 
(R. 483). 
Mr. Thorsen 01-med 354 acres adjoining the subdivision 
development and served by the same ditch system; however, he did 
no ditch excavation on, nor located so as to permit benefit to, 
his own land (R. 486). 
The Trial Court made a bench ruling which expresses his 
findings as well as his conclusions, formulated after he had not 
only viewed the premises (R. 559, 560) but after he had also 
observed the demeanor of the parties. 
These findings articulate the whole case and organize 
the facts according to the record from which those findings draw 
abundance of support. 
The Trial Court made the following findings: 
1. Plaintiffs and their professional engineers, in 
surveying the Property for the subdivision, encountered little if 
any residue of and absolutely no functioning ditch; if the ditch 
had been used it was infrequent before but not at all within the 
last fifteen years (R. 558). 
2. Another (higher) ditch had been the main irrigation 
ditch for the company and the [irrigation] company maintained the 
system (R. 558). 
3. Defendant hired the cleaning of the "ancient ditch" 
for other than a valid purpose and those other purposes were 
demonstrated by such observable things as: 
- the ditch was massive - it was senseless - it 
was purposeless - the damage inflicted was shocking to 
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the Court - the Lmcl h'a:; rendc·rc·d pcrnunuit ly u:,c·lc·s:. 
(R. 559). 
4. Defendant did not consult or obtain approval of the 
irrigation company (R. 560). 
5. Defendant trenched the Property for the direct 
purpose of the injury to Plaintiffs (R. 560). 
6. The ditch was not cleaned on Defendant's own 
property and then therefore in no way did the ditch [or the 
cleaning of it] have any value (R. 560). 
7. The uncleaned part of the ditch had the carrying 
capacity of less than half a second foot of water (R. 560). 
8. Nine lots were destroyed which had a value, in 
their present condition of $6,000.00 each (R. 560). 
Those findings are based upon substantial and in most 
cases uncontradicted evidence particularly the amount of damage 
inflicted and the purposelessness and malicious intent of the 
Defendant in inflicting them. 
The trench which Thorsen ordered, supervised, and paid 
for is portrayed in a number of exhibits. The trenching was 
characterized by witnesses (Esplin, R. 310) and by the Court, the 
Judge having viewed the premises (R. 559), as done on "an ancient 
ditch which had lost its integrity as an irrigation ditch" and 
for all practical purposes Has not being used as an irrigation 
ditch for in excess of fifteen years (R. 558) the:> Trial Court 
finding that the Defendants, without know} edge of the Plaintiffs 
and without consulting them, willfully <md intentionally went in 
and made a: 
massive, senseless, not purpo:;d:u1 
across their premises. 
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ditch 
The Court personally examined the ditch and 
felr that the effect of the cleaning of this 
ditch was it had become a trench and the 
Court finds it is a trench and the Court is 
shocked at the damage which was done to these 
premises. 
The Court has grave doubt whether these 
premises can ever be used for the purpose for 
which they were bought by the Plaintiffs. 
(R. 595). 
The Court found that Thorsen did not consult the 
irrigation company and that Thorsen "was taking his own water 
under his own rights and the Court finds that he [Thorsen] did it 
this way for the direct purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs." 
(R. 560). 2 
Evidence of the waste committed by Defendant was 
established by photographic exhibits, by descriptive testimonies 
and with a view of the property by the Trial Judge (R. 99). 
Representative of this proof are four admitted exhibits attached 
as an Appendix to this Brief (pp. i - iv). Appendix i shows a 
section of a common ditch situated some distance upstream from 
the Property but through which all water must run before it could 
ever reach the subdivision (R. 75-77) and by "common ditch" was 
meant that what limited water it could convey includes even more 
than that which Defendants' property ever received through that 
ditch (R. 152, 155 -157). In other words, the photograph at 
Appendix i shows the restricted maximum amount of water that 
could pass or historically had passed through the ditch at a 
2 Thorsen testified that C!PY ditch in the Gooseberry area 
would be an Irrigation Company CITtch (R. 453, 455, 464, 474). 
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l 
l; 
wate::::- of beth a" _3 ' 
reducec balance as 
the water for which Defend21':: buil'.: the trench sho·,;n in Ap;:ier.dix 
ii, iii, and iv. The Trial Court found the capacity of Appendix 
i to be "less than half a second foot" (R. 560). Pages ii 
through iv of the Apper.dix portray typically, but not 
exhaustively of the record, destruction to terrain, trees, slope, 
and previously-unscarred appearance of the subdivision, but 
moreover illustrate a trench that could carry easily 100 tices 
the water that could, (because of the Appendix i constriction) be 
channeled into it, and the Court so found. 
The Trial Court found that if Defendant had any purpose 
at all it was "to have the luxu::::-y of an extra ditch which was 
senseless under the circumstances" and found that Thorsen "didr.'t 
clea:: this ditch on his o;;n land and didn't clean the ditch in 
such a ',;ay that the ditch had ar.y value." The Court found on tr.e 
basis of expert testicor::i CR. 194 and 196) that less than 
or:e-half of a second foot have gone over the ditch because 
the head of the ditch had dimensions and was limited 
in its capacity by a culvert that the only water tha[ 
co•..ild have gcr.e through trcis ditcl, \·.•hich Defenc'2"C'.: clairr:s is ar 
ro'Jte:, cot.!.lC than one (lZ) per cent of the 
water which needed to 2 throubh the 
- -
;1,·c1Hnrnod;it ion (R. 73). Graphic illustrations of this finding are 
dcmunst rilt eel by Exhibits 12, 14, 15 and 24D which show the 
untouched portion of the ditch, whereas Exhibits 16A- H show the 
massive proportions of the trenching in the same process of which 
over 400 well established and mature-age trees were destroyed 
(R. 290-295). 
Damage Calculations 
An appraiser for the Plaintiff testified about 
comparable tracts of land, one being a "conceptually approved" 
subdivision which was "very similar in nature" located in Sanpete 
County. This parallel property was a 55.47-acre tract engineered 
into 42 lots. With two of the lots retained by the seller the 
area which had been divided merely by platting, sold "wholesale" 
for $240,000.00 or "$6,000.00 per platted lot" (R. 319). When 
the lots were improved, a one-acre lot sold for $14,000.00 on a 
cash basis and another sold for $11,000.00 however prior to the 
completion of programmed improvements (R. 319, 320). The expert 
said that there would be more of a demand for lots "near Salina 
than east of Fairview". He testified that nine or ten of the 
lots in the Johnson subdivision were rendered totally unsalable 
(R. 320-321). 
Using another measure of damages, the same expert said 
th;1t it would cost $80,000.00 to fill in the trench, grade and 
re-seed it, and attempt a restorative tree-planting program; but 
this did not take into consideration the replacement of any trees 
or immediate reforestation of the area so that for years there 
would be no significant tree amenities and "nothing higher than 
the p,rass" (R. 321). 
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The same. expert tc. 1 ;J1(d tp o t1:rd 1·,t11:1l'1 \\t 
calculating dam2ges by plac'ir,;'," ·.;ii"'' of $1'.J,li(<IJ, 11 "'' ''"''11 ],,r 
after it was improved, dcducl•,1, $171,C:<->0.lH' !or .1ggrq:;att' 
on-site developmental costs, $40,000.00 for snle 
expenses, and a projected net loss to the owners of in excess of 
$269,000.00 (R. 323-325). 
One of the Plaintiffs and a Certified Public 
Accountant, William T. Gardner, testified that the total cost of 
completing the project was $171,125 .00 (R. 119). He testified 
that he "adjusted each lot on an individual basis to what he felt 
the decrease in value would have been as a result the Thorsen 
excavation and arrived at a total for 15 damaged lots for a loss 
of $95,850.00." 
Mr. Gardner testified that over 400 hundred trees were 
uprooted and destroyed (R. 290-315) and a florist of 20-years 
experience in shade, fruit and ornamental trees, and trees of all 
types, testified that although most of the trees were large and 
"there was no way you could replace a bigger tree and have them 
live" that the cost of replacing the larger trees would be 
$275.00 each (R. 293). Reclamation of forest character alone 
would have cost $110,000.00. 
There was no purpose at all in beginning the trench 
where it was commenced except to eviscerare the forested 
sub-division (R. 90 lines 5 & 6, 92, 93; Exhihit 6). 
- 1 6 --
ARGill!ENT 
Gcncrnl Stntcmcnt 
-- - -- -----
The Appellant's brief devotes eighteen pages to the 
thesis that Thorsen, the Defendant, had some rights in the 
vestigial remnant of an old ditch. Those "rights" are thin. 
Record pages 191, 197, 215-218, 240, 266, 301, 303 are references 
to testimony that the ditch was not perceptible to engineers who 
said they would have been looking ditch (R. 191), to the 
planning commission inspecting to see whether the higher ditch 
known to be in use would interfere with a subdivision (R. 266, 
301, 303) and to examiners of an aerial photocopy (Exhibit 1). 
The Trial Court ruled from the bench: 
if there had been a ditch there and the Court 
rules that there was a ditch anciently there 
and the ditch had not been used frequently and 
had been used very infrequently and had been 
washed out in numerous places and lost 
integrity as an irrigation ditch * * * and 
was not being used as an irrigation ditch for 
in excess of 15 years * * * there was another 
ditch known as the Ex tens ion Ditch above and 
which, for all practical purposes, had become 
the main irrigation ditch of the Gooseberry 
system which the company maintained and which 
delivered the water to the Thorsen premises. 
(R. 558). 
Even had there been an active, viable, existing ditch 
which Thorsen dredged, the outrageous abuse of an acknowledged 
easement will not be tolerated. An action for damages will lie 
on proof of ahuse of an easement right. Laden v. Atkenson, 116 
P.2d 881, 885 (Mont. 1941) citing [olm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200; 125 
P. 403; 411 LRANS 89 (1912). The question of reasonable use of an 
casement is one of fact and reserved to the jury or the judge 
sitting without a jury to evaluate under relevant surrounding 
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circumstances, and its validity usuillly is one lc>r the trier nf 
facts to determine. Coopc1' u. ;;,; ('''.• 405 P.2cl 3lJl1, ldJ Haw. J')11 , 
538. See also to same effect: ,';/:('I I 
Okl. 
1'i rr. Ii ul, 1'. 
DeShazer, 159 P.2d 464, 195 34 7. The trench that 
eviscerated the subdivision was variously described by those who 
saw it as shocking as was the damage done to the premises 
(District Judge R. 559); one which had "torn up the ground and 
excavated extremely large rocks; denuded the property; just a 
heck of a big ditch for no reason unless they had an awful lot of 
water going through." (the appraiser, R. 310). It destroyed 
over 400 trees not counting the small ones. 
R. 295). 
(one Plaintiff, 
Also on extensive testimony the the Court ruled there 
was no utility nor reason for the trench or "ditch" (R. 90-93, 
208) causing him to observe that Thorsen made a "massive, 
senseless, not purposeful ditch" (R. 55) and that Thorsen 
retained the services of Donald Gates "for the purpose of 
cleaning this ancient ditch for purposes known only to himself 
(R. 559) and for the direct purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs." 
(R. 560). The Court found that the same ditch was not cleaned on 
Thorsen's own land leaving the entire ditch from head to bottom 
valueless (R. 560). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
JO!INSONS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
AGAINST THORSEN IN ANY EVENT. 
There is a principle of law that an easement is 
abandoned or that the claimant will be estopped to assert it if a 
proprietor of land in good faith constructs improvements or makes 
expenditures of money where actions of a claimant of an easement 
are inconsistent with its existence. The erection by the 
dominant owner of something incompatible with the exercise of the 
easement is evidence of abandonment. 25 Am. Jur. 508, 509, 
Easements and Licenses, §104. 
The higher ditch carried all the water necessary to 
irrigate Thorsen's land for many years and that was the practice 
at all times since 1964 (R. 152-155). 
Even by his own admission, Defendant Thorsen's land 
required several times the capacity of the old ditch even when it 
had been operated (R. 456). Thorsen's land was often delivered 
10 cubic feet per second (R. 153, 154) and much more when high 
water was being delivered (R. 153). The maximum capacity of the 
usable part of the abandoned easement was 8/lOths or 9/lOths of a 
second foot (R. 155, 194). The Court found that it could have 
carried "less than half a second foot" (R. 560). Moreover, the 
Court found that "it had been washed out in numerous places and 
lost its integrity as an irrigation ditch and had not been used 
as an irrigation ditch in excess of 15 years." (R. 558). 
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Engineers (R. 191), the Pl:rnnin,; Corr.missiun (R. 26G, 
301), and the Plaintiffs thcrnsc l vc (R. ')!,(). 
other than the iemnant ,;f An old :m11;;l',,blc· dirr·h. The 1:1rte1, 
based upon this, design· J and Sf' •L extenc;1.,;e amounts of money 
planning a subdivision (R. 145, 22.C, 269, 279). 
Even if there were any rights in the old unused ditch, 
the trenching along either side of it and the atrocious expansion 
of it constituted a gross abuse, damages sustained under which 
are compensable by the Court. 25 Arn. Jur. 2d, 524, Damages, 
§122; 28 C.J.S. 773, Easements, §93. 
Thorsen had no continuing interest in any ditch across 
Johnson's land. 
Thorsen's intentional damage to Johnson's Property was 
an abuse of any easement which may have existed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAfA,AGES MUST BE 
UPHELD. 
A. DAMAGES SUPPORTABLE UNDER ANY ONE OR MORE 
THEORIES WILL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
B. DAMAGES COULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNDER ANY 
ONE OF FOUR METHODS OF CALCULATION. 
A. DAMAGES SUPPORTABLE UNDER ANY ONE OR MORE 
THEORIES WlLL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
In Limb vs. Federated lk Producers, 23 U. 2d 222, 461 
P.2d 290 (1969) this Court held that a judgment of the Tri;il 
Court will be affirmed if sustainable on any legal ground or 
theories apparent in the record. 
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.. 
In ,;,,,u.:r;e 1 I vs. l!er,ortrcc"!t of Busine.ss Regulatior., 523 
I'. !cl U lU (Utah 19711) this Court likewise held that under several 
t IH,ori es presented to the Trial Court the Appellate Court will 
affirm any result which finds support in the record irrespective 
of the theory under which that ground or basis was argued (cited 
at 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §1464(1). 
Therefore, under any theory or method or calculating 
damages, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover at the least the 
amount fixed by the Trial Court, which was the most modest of all 
awards possible. 
B. DAMAGES COULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED UNDER ANY 
ONE OF FOUR METHODS OF CALCULATION. 
As we will discuss in Point III we do not concede that 
Defendant is entitled to restrict Plaintiffs' recoverable damages 
to those which would be available in a condemnation case since 
Thorsen does not have authority to condemn. Nevertheless under 
well-established principles of measured condemnation damages there 
is abundant evidence in the record to establish the amount awarded 
by the Trial Court if this case were tried as a condemnation. 
Plaintiffs' appraiser Esplin testified that after 
investigating the market and "tying this into the sale of another 
property" he found a comparable where the subdivision was not 
developed but "conceptually approved* * "very similar in nature 
,. ,,, '''and not finally approved at the time of the sale." The 
proposed subdivision was sold wholesale (40 lots of a 42 proposal) 
with a sale price of $42, 000. 00 or $6, 000. 00 per platted lot. 
This price was before water was installed and without sewer 
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(R. 319). Esp 1 in t es t i f i ('cl t o nu rn C' ,- ,, us 1 n t s :il c " w i thou t any 
subdivision improvements justifvi11,-, '.l ',IJ00.11(1 v,iluc on c·;ich 
proposed lot in the Plaintif1-s' l""l-"-'n:y (1'.120). Ile tcstilicd 
that 10 lots were "bi1dly clarn,1gecl" '"'d h;;J liven d<=crc•ased in voluc 
by $6,000.00 per lot (R.320) ;rncl said that restoration of the 
property if the Plaintiffs wished to continue development would 
be $80,000.00 in a condition where "there would be no trees* * '' 
nothing higher than grass." 
He testified that "there is* '' * enough damage* * * that 
it may not be economically feasible to go ahead with it" (R.322). 
The same witness testified to a "before and after value" 
of $80,000.00 damages which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 
33A (R.357). 
Where property has different values so that it may be 
used for different purposes, all of such values 
into consideration, and the owner is entitled 
should be taken 
to recover the 
highest value. In establishing the market value of land, it does 
not necessarily follow that the landowner is limited to the value 
of the land for such purpose only; its market value for any 
purpose for which it could be sold in the open must be 
considered * * * 25 C.J.S., Damages, §88, p.973. 
It is axiomatic that an ovmer can testify to the value 
of his own land or dami1ges to it and certainly even in a 
condemnation case. 27 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §281, p.711. 
One of the owners and a CPA, Rill Gard11er, testific>d 
that net damages were $95,850.00 (shuwinv proportional losses to 
all of the lots) by adjusti.ng the clecre.1:,ed valu(' of 15 of the 
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total 3J lots (J,, 173-125). If the subdivision had been allowed 
I'' procvccl th<' cexpected profit, 
;i] 1 impruvc>mc>nts and sales 
after paying costs to complete 
commissions, would have been 
$2G9,000.00 (R. 322-325). 
Aesthetic value of trees is a measure of damages. 
Kroulik vs. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1981). Their loss 
was $110,000.00 (R. 293). 
The Trial Court adopted the most modest of the several 
methods of assessment of damages. 
While the Trial Court fixed the damages at the least of 
all the possible alternatives the evidence produced the 
authorities are that in the event of destruction of incidents to 
land by severance or destruction that valuation which will prove 
most beneficial to the injured party should be adopted for the 
reason that he is entitled to the benefit of his property intact. 
Marrion vs. Anderson, 36 Wash.2d 353, 218 P.2d 320,321 (1950). 
In fixing damages the Trial Court is vested with broad 
disertion and the award will not be set aside unless it 
m;inifestly appears to be unjust, influenced by prejudice, or in 
disregard of pertinent details. Clayton vs. Crossroads Equipment 
Company, 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982). 
For reasons upon which we will elaborate in Point III 
the "willing-seller - willing-buyer" hypothesis is not present 
he-re, and cvcn though 1ve have justified the Trial Court's award 
of clamages on traditional eminent domain barometers the best that 
Defendant can claim is that damages in this case are not 
susceptible of precise determination and a failure to prove an 
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exact dollar loss sor1ehow wc0kells PLiintiffs' clair.1. Thi,; i:: nut 
the law in Utah nor in any other j•.:r1·.dictirn1. 
In all cases j t• Vl' l Vill{', C"COfLC 11lli C t l1rc>111·.li 
destruction of an enterpri sv be> int' 1· .. :,,r:1l'n ial ly pursued the rule 
against recovery of uncertain d;n'.1riges is directed against 
uncertainty with respect to cause rather than to measure or 
extent and a responsible party cannot escape liability because of 
uncertainty in amount of the full damage. If some speculation 
must be indulged to project full damage the duty to prove damages 
is satisfied by evidence that provides a reasonable basis for 
their assessment. Gould vs. /.Jourdain States Telephone & 
Telegraph, 6 U.2d 187, 309 P.2d 802, 805-806 (1957). 
In Security Development Company vs. Fedco, Inc., 23 
U.2d 306, 462 P.2d 706, 709-710 (1960) this Court held: 
If a reasonable basis of calculation is 
afforded, it is sufficient although the 
result is only approximate* * * and only when 
there is a complete absence of probable facts 
to support the conclusion reached does a 
reversible error appear. 
In fiinsness vs. M. ,J, Conoco IJ<:stributoN;, Inc., 593 
P.2d 1303, this Court held that the evidence, although meager and 
imprecise, still would permit the common sense of the jury to 
place it in perspective for probable resolution of the damage 
issue (593 P.2d at 1309). Here the evidence is neither meager 
nor imprecise. 
If the Plaintiff has produced the best evid<'nce 
available and it is sufficient to afford a rcasonriblc basis for 
estimating his loss, the Plaintiff wi l 1 not be denic•d subst:mt ial 
recovery because the amount of dnr1:1ge j :; incap . .11 l c of exact 
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nscertairn:ienl. hr·eo!' Klinker' Scznri {; Gravel Company, 374 P.2d 
Jn f.' •. 1·r:.c c·at tee Cor-:po11y vs. Pa1•ad1:se Motors, Inc., 448 
l'.2d 866. 104 Ariz. 66 (1968) the Court held, where expert 
testimony was used to project future profits, that loss of 
profits from destruction of a business may be recovered if the 
amount of actual loss is rendered reasonably certain by competent 
proof; that proof of damages relaxes the requirement for 
precision. 
In Story Parchment Company vs. Peterson Parchment Paper 
Company, 282 U.S. 555, 51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 544, the 
distinction is made between cases when the fact of damage is 
uncertain and those in which the amount is not fixed. The rule, 
still prevailing, is that once the fact of damages is established 
with certainty the rule is relaxed to allow the trier of fact to 
determine from the best evidence what the correct full measure of 
damages should be. 
POINT I II 
THORSEN DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO CONDEMN 
JOHNSON'S PROPERTY. 
The Defendant's theoretical "eminent domain" rule of 
damage is inapplicable for the over arching reason that Thorsen 
condemned property because he did not want it 
develupPd; arguing after the fact that rules of eminent domain 
reslrict Plaintiffs and shield Defendants in narrowing the rules 
f 01- <I\·Ja rd i ng darn.:ige s. 
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Constitutional and stntuto1·y C'lllillent d<•1":1i11 righ1 •; dlld 
correlative duties are> an in:-;trun•1·rt l)f (•)<: jl('(l i l'll\ \' l () l ,-1]· ( 
property for an e s s en t i a 1 "1 h 1 i c o r h i g h c r u ;, c i 1 t· v s p e ,. t i v c· o f 
the willingness of an owne1 o sell. T!tese laws c1·eate a fiction 
that an amount can be pu·, 11lated with a willint-; buyer and a 
constructive willing seller and, through the use of comparables, 
presume that the owner not only would sell but would be willing 
to sell for prices synthesized from a collection of related or 
similar transactions. 
Arguing rules of 
intentional waste to real 
statutory rules of multiple 
trespass to try title. 
eminent 
property 
damages 
domain in 
is parallel 
in a common 
a 
to 
law 
case of 
arguing 
case of 
The law of eminent domain is singularly coercive and in 
some applications permissively confiscatory in depriving an owner 
of incidents he would enjoy if he were at liberty to enforce 
a higher price by exerting his own inflexibility. United States 
vs. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1942), is 
an example where value enhancement by reason of the project for 
which the condemnation is pursued was not compensable to the 
landowner. 
Eminent domain precludes an owner from speculating upon 
his own property, from obtaining value for its adaptability to 
his own peculiar needs, and from accommodation to his reluctilncc 
to part with the land for present and future economic, tax, or 
like considerations (27 Am. Jur. p.69, Eminent DoTJ1ili.n §279) nnd 
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de.st roy:, the adrni ttedly lesser attitudes of sentimental 
,, t t ,Jc·h1111'11 L ;rnc\ prick of ownership. 
}';ll'rncnts which possibly, though not probably, would 
allcct values are similarly excluded in determining market value 
in eminent domain proceedings. People vs. Oceanshore Railroad, 
Inc., 32 Cal.2d 406, 196 P.2d 576, ALR.2d 1179. In 1 ike manner 
future uses which are peculiar to the particular plans or 
projects of the present owner will not be shown or taken into 
consideration. Arkansas State Highway Commission vs. Watkins, 
229 Ark. 27, 313 S.W.2d 86; Maynard vs. Nemaha Valley Drainage 
District, 94 Neb. 610, 143 N.W. 927. 
The rigid eminent domain tests 3 of market value may not 
allow the property's value for a special purpose to be considered 
but its fair market value in view of all purposes for which it is 
naturally adapted may be. (27 Am. Jur. 2d p. 74, Eminent Domain, 
§281). Thus the Courts have sometimes excluded from damages in 
eminent domain proceedings values having peculiar merit to the 
owner himself. 
This ought not to be the law in the case of an 
intentional commission of waste to real property because if so 
any person could compel another to alienate his property. 
The rule applicable to an intentional, willful, 
malicious tresp,,s;. ought to be that one applied in measuring 
darnngc':o fur wnste tu real property. 
'j 
By so asserting Plaintiffs do not in any way concede that 
the eviden1'l' dues not risc> to meet those tests. 
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In those cases the r'1l'dSLJrc· of da1:i;11'.c1. i :. l he• di r•·i ni :.hc·d 
value of the land or eslate, taken at its <Jctui•l \'<d11c if the· 
waste was not willfully done, and at tlw hLgltc•st probabll' or 
speculative value warranted by the evidence if lhe waste was 
willfully committed (93 C.J.S. p. 577, Waste, §18). 
In any case where there are any fiduciary contacts 
between the perpetrator of waste on real property and its owner 
this rule should apply. 
Here Harry Thorsen was secretary, director and an 
officer of Gooseberry Irrigation Company (R. 469); as such he 
owed a responsibility to all of the individuals who were 
irrigator-stockholders from the stream including the Plaintiffs. 
He also owed fiduciary duty to see that the rights-of-way for the 
streams flowing through another's property be managed in such a 
way as to commit the least amount of injury to the burdened 
estate. 
Thorsen himself had individual but also representative 
rights in the Johnsons' land to the extent, and only to the 
extent, of the easement in the higher ditch. This ditch 
discharged 10 second feet of water onto Thorsen' s land 
traditionally (R. 153, 154). Thorsen as secretary of the 
irrigation company had a fiduciary responsibility to the servient 
owners to see that this water did them the least amount of 
damage. That duty would have been achieved so long as the water 
remained in the higher ditch designed to accommodate that full 
flow and the rest of the land remained undisturbed. 
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When Thorsen maliciously commits injury to the property 
by what the Trial Court characterized as a senseless, 
ml'auingless, valueless trench, he has breached a common-sense if 
not a fiduciary responsibility and is in much the same condition 
as an individual in possession of property who commits willful 
and intentional waste thereon contemplated by the citation from 
Corpus Juris Secondum above. 
We respectfully submit that the Trial Court grossly 
understated the amount of damages which the Plaintiffs should 
recover from the Defendant but in any event cannot be reversed 
for inexactness. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's award of damages based upon the 
lowest-yielding formula, in a case of clear, indisputable 
liability, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
- 29 -
1 hereby certify that t1·1u (2) coµico; of the forq,oillg 
Brief of Respondents were m2ilnl to r:r. Norm:rn I!. Jackson, 
Attorney for Appellant, 151 N\Jrth Main Street, Richfield, Utah 
(84701), by U.S. Regular Mail, Postage Prepaid, on this 31st day 
of October, 1983. 
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Appendix p. i [Exhibit 14; see Brief p. 13) 
Illustrates carrying capacity of an approach section to area dredged by Defendant. 
Appendix p. 11 [Exhibit 16A] 
Vertical cut; dumping on lower bank with dredged material; typical tree destruct:ion. 
Appendix iii [Exhibit 160] 
Typical destruction of trees; exposure of deep stratum of coarse rock. 
Typical cross-section: 
Appendix iv [Exhibit 16H] 
depth of dredging and breadth of disturbance and 
